ABSTRACT Remote user authentication is a cryptographic mechanism through which a remote server verifies the legitimacy of an authorized user over an insecure communication channel. Most of the existing authentication schemes consider single-server environments and require multiple registrations of the same user for multiple servers. Moreover, most of these schemes do not consider biometric template revocation and error correction for noisy biometric signals. In addition, the existing schemes have several weaknesses, including stolen smart card attack, lack of user anonymity, user impersonation attack, and non-diversification of biometric data. To overcome these disadvantages, we propose a new three-factor authenticated key agreement scheme using a fuzzy commitment approach. The three factors used in the proposed scheme are the user's password, smart card, and personal biometrics. The security of the proposed scheme is verified using a formal security analysis under the broadly accepted Real-Or-Random model for the session key security. The widely accepted Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic is also applied for mutual authentication between a legally registered user and a server, and formal security verification using the broadly accepted Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications is performed for the proposed scheme through simulation to show that it is secure. In addition, the informal security analysis of the proposed scheme shows that the scheme can resist other known attacks. Finally, a comparative study of the proposed scheme with the existing related schemes is conducted to measure the tradeoff among the security and functionality features and the communication and computation costs.
For example, only authorized patients can access a medical server for medical services.
Password-based authentication is the earliest authentication system and is widely used in different systems to make services available only to authorized users. The first password-based authentication scheme was introduced by Lamport [1] in 1981. In this scheme, a server maintains a password table; hence, this scheme is not able to prevent a stolen-verifier attack. Later, many researchers reported improved password-based authentication schemes to address the above problem [2] [3] [4] . However, passwords are often chosen from user's social information or are composed of low-entropy information. These passwords can be computed via either social engineering or dictionary attacks. To overcome this problem, researchers have studied token-based authentication combined with knowledge-based authentication to provide two-factor authentication [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . Unfortunately, the smart card (i.e., token) may be damaged or stolen by an attacker. The stored information is easily extracted from the stolen smart card using power analysis attacks [8] , [9] .
He et al. [6] observed that Wu et al.'s smart-card-based remote authentication scheme [5] is vulnerable to impersonation and privileged-insider attacks if the smart card is stolen. Subsequently, He et al. proposed an improved authentication scheme to overcome the weaknesses found in Wu et al.'s scheme [5] . Unfortunately, Zhu [7] found that He et al.'s scheme [6] is also not secure with respect to offline password guessing attacks, and they proposed an RSA-based authentication scheme [7] . Similarly, the literature contains many two-factor-based authentication schemes [10] [11] [12] [13] .
A user's biometrics (e.g., fingerprint, iris, palm print, face and voice) [14] have been integrated with a password and smart card to enhance the level of security of a remote authentication scheme [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . Lee et al. [15] proposed a fingerprint-based authentication scheme following ElGamal's public key cryptosystem. In their scheme, the user's password, smart card and fingerprint minutiae are used for strengthening the security level of the authentication scheme. However, their scheme is vulnerable to masquerade and server spoofing attacks [19] , [20] . To withstand these security flaws, Lin and Lai [20] proposed an improved authentication scheme by combining a password and fingerprint minutiae template to form a super password. Unfortunately, Mitchell and Tang [22] analyzed Lin and Lai's scheme [20] and observed that it is not secure because the smart card stores insufficient information for checking the correctness of old passwords.
Most of the existing authentication and session key agreement protocols reported in the literature consider a singleserver environment. In reality, users may want to access multiple servers for different services. In a single-server environment, if a user wants to access multiple servers, he/she needs to register with all the servers, and multiple logins are required. This limitation of single-server authenticated key agreement schemes can be addressed with the implementation of multi-server authentication schemes. Therefore, it is essential to provide an authentication scheme for multi-server environments. Several three-factor authentication schemes [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] have been proposed for multi-server environments. Li et al. [28] noted that the scheme in [24] is vulnerable to stolen smart card attacks. Mishra et al. [27] also observed that the schemes in [23] and [26] fail to resist insider attacks, and the scheme in [25] cannot resist stolen smart card, server spoofing & impersonation attacks.
Amin and Biswas proposed an authenticated key agreement scheme for a multi-medical-server environment. However, Das et al. [29] observed that Amin and Biswas's scheme [30] is vulnerable to multiple attacks, and it does not support a biometric update phase. Subsequently, Das et al. [29] incorporated this phase into their scheme.
Lu et al. [31] and Wang et al. [32] also designed improved authentication schemes over Mishra et al.'s scheme [27] . He and Wang [33] presented a robust biometrics-based multi-server authentication protocol. However, Odelu et al. [34] noted that He-Wang's protocol [33] cannot prevent known session temporary information, replay and impersonation attacks. In addition, the protocol does not preserve strong user anonymity. To erase these security loopholes, Odelu et al. [34] proposed a new multi-server authentication protocol.
Reddy et al. [35] cryptanalyzed Lu et al.'s scheme [31] and noted its security weaknesses, such as impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks. In addition, Lu et al.'s scheme [31] lacks user anonymity and perfect forward secrecy properties. Then, they designed an improved robust elliptic-curve-cryptography-based authentication scheme for multi-server environments.
Reddy et al. [36] analyzed the scheme of Wang et al. [32] and noted several weaknesses, such as vulnerability to impersonation and insider attacks. Additionally, Wang et al.'s scheme [32] lacks anonymity. To overcome the security loopholes found in Wang et al.'s scheme, Reddy et al. [36] proposed an enhanced multi-server authentication scheme.
Chatterjee et al. [37] designed a new biometric-based authentication protocol using the Chebyshev chaotic map. Their protocol offers small key size, fast computation and high efficiency for multi-server environments compared to existing schemes. Furthermore, Kumari et al. [38] proposed a biometrics-based authentication scheme for multi-server environments. Their scheme applies the fuzzy extractor method to provide proper matching of biometric patterns.
Most of the existing biometric-based authentication schemes for mutual authentication and session key agreement in multi-server environments do not consider the following requirements: 1) the privacy of the biometric identity of a user, 2) diversification of the biometric template for revocability and 3) periodic biometric template update. In this paper, we aim to design a new multi-server authentication protocol that makes use of the fuzzy commitment approach for biometric verification.
A. THREAT MODEL
We assume that any two participants in a network communicate over an insecure channel using the broadly accepted Dolev-Yao threat (DY) model [39] . Under the DY model, an adversary A can not only eavesdrop on the messages transmitted between the communicating participants but also can modify and delete the contents of the transmitted messages or even insert an entirely fake message during the communication. In addition, via a power analysis attack [8] , [9] , A can extract all the sensitive secret credentials stored in the lost or stolen smart card of a legal registered user. Another adversary model known as the Canetti and Krawczyk adversary model (CK-adversary model) [40] is the current de facto standard in modeling authentication and key agreement protocols. The CK-adversary model allows A to not only intercept, modify and delete messages (as in the DY model) but also to compromise the secret credentials, including the session keys and the session states. Therefore, the security of an authentication and key agreement protocol should ensure that the leakage of some forms of secret credentials, such as session ephemeral secrets or session keys, will lead to the minimum possible effect on the security of the other secret credentials of the entities involved in the communication [34] .
B. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
The main contributions are listed below:
• A new multi-server authentication mechanism scheme using the fuzzy commitment approach is proposed. In the proposed scheme, each server S j and user U i need to register with the trusted registration center RC. After mutual authentication, both U i and S j establish a session key SK ij for their secure communication. The session key is constructed using both the short-term and longterm secret credentials, so the proposed scheme achieves the ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attack under the CK-adversary model (as discussed in the threat model in Section I-A). In addition, the proposed scheme supports an efficient password/biometric update phase and a smart card revocation phase.
• The proposed scheme's formal security analysis is tested with the widely used ROR model. Furthermore, the mutual authentication between U i and S j is proved using the broadly accepted BAN logic proof. In addition, informal security analysis and formal security verification using the widely used AVISPA simulated tool are conducted to show that the proposed scheme can resist several known attacks.
• A detailed comparative study on the security & functionality features and the communication and computation overheads demonstrates that the proposed scheme provides superior security and efficiency compared to other related authentication schemes.
C. ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the necessary mathematical preliminaries needed to discuss and analyze the proposed scheme in this paper. In Section III, various phases related to the proposed scheme are discussed. Section IV gives a rigorous security evaluation of the proposed scheme using both formal and informal security analysis. In addition, formal security verification using the AVISPA tool is performed in Section V. In Section VI, a detailed comparative study of the proposed scheme and other related schemes is conducted. The paper is finally concluded in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly discuss about the cryptographic one way hash function, revocable template generation, error correction coding and fuzzy commitment scheme that are needed to describe and analyze the proposed scheme.
A. CRYPTOGRAPHIC ONE-WAY HASH FUNCTION
A hash function h: A → B is defined as a deterministic mapping from a set A = {0, 1} * of documents (strings) of variable length to another set B = {0, 1} l of strings of fixed length, say l bits (called the hash outputs or message digests). The one-way cryptographic hash function is a specialized hash function that has the following properties:
• For any input x ∈ A, it is easy to compute h(x). The term easy refers to polynomial or less time complexity. Additionally, the function h(·) is deterministic in nature, i.e., the same message always results in the same hash value.
• Any change in an input x ∈ A would result in a hash value that is completely uncorrelated with the hash value h(x), and it appears to be random.
• Preimage resistance: As the name ''one-way'' implies, it is computationally infeasible to find the original message x given the message digest h(x) of x ∈ A. This property is also referred to as the one-way property.
• Second preimage resistance: For any given x ∈ A, it is computationally infeasible to find another x ∈ A such that h(x) = h(x ). This property is also called the weakcollision resistant property.
• Strong collision resistance: A collision in a one-way hash function is defined as h(x) = h(x ) for any x, x ∈ A and x = x . The collision resistance property states that it is also computationally infeasible to find any two inputs x, x ∈ A such that x = x with h(x) = h(x ).
The above one-way hash function h(·) with collision resistance is formally defined as follows [41] . 
where Pr[X ] is the probability of a random event X , and the pair (ins 1 , ins 2 ) ∈ R A indicates that the input strings ins 1 and ins 2 are randomly picked by A. An (ψ, t)-adversary A attacking the collision resistance of h(·) means that the runtime of A is at most t and that Adv HASH A (t) ≤ ψ.
B. REVOCABLE TEMPLATE GENERATION
A revocable template, also known as a cancelable template [42] , is used in biometric-based systems to ensure the privacy and revocability of biometric data. Biometric data (for example, the minutiae set of fingerprint BIO) is transformed into a revocable form, say revocable or cancelable template C T , using a transformation function, say f (·), with the help of a transformation parameter T p , that is,
The following properties should be satisfied by a revocable template generation process:
(i) Collision-free template generation: The privacy of a user should be protected through the cancelable template; that is, the cancelable template should not leak any information about the real biometric data of a user.
C. ERROR CORRECTION TECHNIQUE
In a biometric system, intra-user variation is treated as error in the biometric template. Error correction coding is used to handle errors in the biometric template due to noise in the biometric image [43] . Assume that the template is generated from an instance BIO enrol (i.e., C T enrol = f (BIO enrol , T p )) at the time of enrollment and that the query template is generated from another instance BIO query (i.e., C T query = f (BIO query , T p )) of the same biometric data at the time of authentication. The difference between the two templates can be computed using the Hamming distance, that is, e = HammDist(C T enrol , C T query ), which is known as the error. The error e can be corrected if and only if the error correction capacity of the error correction technique is not less than e bits. The error correction technique [44] , [45] includes two main steps: 1) encoding and 2) decoding. In the encoding part, an input string is encoded, which produces a codeword. It is assumed that during the transmission of the codeword, some noise may result in error in the transmitted signal, and the recipient therefore receives the erroneous codeword. According to the error correction capacity, erroneous codewords may be decoded correctly into the original string.
D. FUZZY COMMITMENT SCHEME
In the literature, biometric data are used in many remote authentication and key exchange protocols using one-way hashing, biohashing and fuzzy extractor techniques. According to the analysis of Nagar et al. [46] , biohashing template transformation is vulnerable to intrusion and linkage attacks. An intruder may obtain a close approximation of the original biometric template using a biohashed value of the biometric data. A one-way hash function may enhance the error due to the fuzziness of biometric data. The one-way hash function may generate a completely different template for even a single-bit variation in the biometric data [47] , [48] . Therefore, a fuzzy extractor is introduced to extract an error-tolerant random string similar to the enrolled string from the same biometric data but with noise. The fuzzy commitment technique introduced by Juels and Wattenberg [49] is used in biometric-based remote authentication. This scheme has two main steps: 1) locking a secret and 2) releasing the secret. In the literature, many works have reported on the biometric-based fuzzy commitment scheme [43] . A randomly generated cryptographic key K r is encoded into its equivalent codeword, that is, θ ps = ε enc (K r ), where ε enc is an error correction encoding technique. A binary string C T i is then derived from the biometric data and is called the cancelable biometric template. This template is used to lock (i.e., commit) the encoded key θ ps following bit-wise XOR operation of C T i and θ ps , which produces helper data H = C T i ⊕ θ ps . In the system, only H and the hash of key (h(K r )) are stored, and H may be declared as public. This phase is called enrollment. By contrast, in the authentication phase, a genuine user provides his/her biometric data and transformation parameters to produce a query biometric template C T i . The query template is then XORed with the helper data H to unlock θ ps , that is,
If the Hamming distance between the enrolled template and the query template is e, then θ ps = θ ps ⊕ e. The error in the query template is propagated to the encoded key, and this error can be corrected by the error correction technique during the decoding process (i.e., K r = ε dec (θ ps )) if the error correction capacity is greater than the error. In other words, in this scheme, the key K r is decoded exactly with a sufficiently closed biometric template C T i . h(K r ) is used to compare the regenerated key K r from H with the original key K r .
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
This section presents six procedures to describe our remote multi-server authentication and key agreement scheme using biometrics: 1) server registration, 2) user registration, 3) login, 4) mutual authentication and key agreement, 5) password and biometric template update, and 6) smart card revocation.
• In the registration phase, each server, say S j , is registered with the registration center RC; then, the users register themselves through the registration center RC.
• In the login phase, any registered user authenticates smart card SC i by providing his/her identity ID i , password PW i and biometric information BIO i to initiate the protocol.
• In the authentication and key exchange phase, mutual authentication between an authorized registered user U i and a registered server S j is performed, and a session key SK ij between U i and S j is established between them.
• The proposed scheme also includes a password and biometric template update phase. If a user U i needs to update their biometric data and password, he/she can login and update the information.
• If the smart card is lost or damaged, a new smart card can be issued by the provided smart card revocation phase in our scheme. The notations used in this scheme are given in Table 1 . 
A. SERVER REGISTRATION PROCEDURE
In the proposed scheme, all the servers S j , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, where m is the total number of available servers in the network initially, are required to register with the trusted registration center RC. For this purpose, each server S j must dispatch a registration request along with its unique identity SID j to the RC if it is willing to become an authorized server for providing services to the registered users. Accordingly, the RC sends a secret key PSK j = h(SID j ||X c ) to each S j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) via the Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2) [50] . Note that PSK j is unique for each server S j and that it is used during the mutual authentication process of a user U i and a server S j discussed in Section III-D. Simultaneously, the RC assumes that another m servers may register themselves with the RC in the near future. Therefore, the RC chooses their identities SID l and generates the shared keys
The server identities (for m + m servers) and their corresponding secret keys pairs {(SID j , PSK j )|1 ≤ j ≤ m + m } are stored in the database of the RC. In this way, the registered users do not need to reregister with the RC to gain access to newly registered servers.
B. USER REGISTRATION PROCEDURE
Initially, each user U i is required to register with the RC through a secure channel. In this phase, U i needs to choose a user identity ID i , password PW i , an application specific transformation parameter T P i and a random number R ci . U i also provides his/her biometric data to a biometric sensor, which captures biometric data BIO i . U i applies T P i to generate the cancelable biometric template C T i from BIO i using a cancelable transformation function f (·). The user registration procedure is summarized in Figure 1 . The detailed steps are described as follows. 
, AM j and BM j for security purposes.
C. LOGIN PROCEDURE
In this phase, a registered user U i inserts the smart card SC i into the card reader of a specific terminal, and provides his/her identity ID i and password PW i . U i also scans his/her biometrics at the biometric sensor for authentication. The detailed steps are given below.
1) U i scans his/her biometrics, e.g., fingerprint, and extracts feature BIO i from the captured fingerprint image. 2) U i inserts the smart card into the card reader and enters the credentials ID i , PW i and BIO i for authentication.
3) The smart card SC i generates the cancelable fingerprint
and decodes R c using error correction, that is, R ci = ε dec (R c ). SC i then compares the computed h(R ci ) with the stored R. If they are not equal, the session is terminated. 4) SC i computes r i = h(R ci ||ID i ||PW i ) and checks whether h(r i ) = h(r i ). If it does not, SC i terminates the session immediately.
. SC i then selects a random nonce N 1 , generates current time stamp TS i , and computes 
D. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT PROCEDURE
After the successful login of a registered user U i , the authentication of an application server S j is verified. After successful mutual authentication, the session key is established between U i and S j . The login & mutual authentication and key agreement procedures are briefly described in Figure 2 . The detailed steps are given below. 1) S j receives the login request M 2 , M 3 , M 4 , TS i at time TS i and computes the time delay, FIGURE 2 . Mutual authentication and key agreement process. VOLUME 6, 2018 
E. PASSWORD AND BIOMETRIC TEMPLATE UPDATE PROCEDURE
In this section, we describe the password change and biometric template update procedures for a legal registered user U i . To update the current password and biometric template, U i needs to login successfully to the system. In these procedures, there is no involvement of the registration center RC, and the entire process is executed locally without involving the RC. The process is summarized in Figure 3 . The detailed steps are described below. 1) U i inputs the credentials ID i , PW i , and BIO i after inserting his/her SC i into a card reader to login to the system. The extracted feature BIO i from the captured BIO i is computed. SC i then computes 
T new P i
as the new transformation parameter. Subsequently, the new cancelable template is generated as C new 3) U i chooses a new random number R new ci and computes 
i 's memory. The smart card revocation procedure is summarized in Figure 4 . 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the proposed scheme from the security analysis perspective using all possible analyses, namely, formal security under the broadly accepted RealOr-Random (ROR) model [40] , [51] , mutual authentication proof using the widely used Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic [52] and informal (non-mathematical) security analysis.
A. FORMAL SECURITY USING THE ROR MODEL
The purpose of the formal security analysis of the proposed scheme using the ROR model [40] , [51] is to prove that it provides session key (SK) security against a passive/active adversary, say A. Recently, the ROR-model-based formal security analysis has gained popularity and has been applied in various authentication key exchange protocols [37] , [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] . To proceed with the formal security, we first briefly discuss the ROR model and then provide the main proof in Theorem 1.
1) ROR MODEL
There are two participants in the proposed scheme, namely, a user U i and a server S j , during the mutual authentication and key agreement procedure. The principal components related to the ROR model for the proposed scheme are discussed below. Under the ROR model, an adversary is modeled using the broadly accepted Dolev-Yao (DY) threat model, as defined in our threat model in Section I-A. According to the DY model, A can intercept, modify, delete, or even inject some or all messages exchanged between the communicating participants U i and S j with the help of the following queries:
Execute(I u , I s ): This query implements an eavesdropping attack that allows A to read the messages exchanged between U i and S j .
Send(I t , M ): This query implements an active attack wherein A can send a message M to a participant instance I t , and in reply, it receives a response from I t .
Reveal(I t ): Using this query, A can know the session key SK ij established between I t and its partner in the current session.
CorruptSmartCard(I u U i
): This query is modeled as an active attack, wherein A can extract all the sensitive secret information stored in its memory via power analysis attacks [8] , [9] .
Test(I t ): In this query, an unbiased coin c is flipped before the game is started, and its output is used as a decider. Let A execute this query. If the session key SK ij shared between U i and S j is fresh, I t returns SK ij when c = 1 or a random number when c = 0. Otherwise, a null value (⊥) is returned.
In this formal security analysis, we restrict A to permit a limited number of CorruptSmartCard(I u U i ) queries. However, A is permitted to execute an unlimited number of Test(I t ) queries. VOLUME 6, 2018 f: SEMANTIC SECURITY Under the semantic security, it is required that A cannot distinguish the real session key SK ij from a random number. The output of Test(I t ) is checked for consistency verification against a random bit c. Let A's guessed bit be c and let Succ be the winning probability in the game. Then, a polynomial time t adversary A's advantage in breaking the session key (SK) security of the proposed scheme, say P, is defined as Adv A P (t) = |2.Pr[Succ] − 1| = |2.Pr[c = c] − 1|, where Pr[X ] denotes the probability of an event X .
g: RANDOM ORACLE
In our scheme, we use the one-way cryptographic hash function h(·) that is accessible by all the participants, including the adversary A. We model h(·) as a random oracle, say H.
2) SECURITY PROOF
The SK security of the proposed scheme under the ROR model is provided in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: Let Adv A P (t) be polynomial-time t-adversary A's advantage function in breaking the SK security of the proposed scheme P. Then,
where q h , q s , l, |Hash| and |D| are the number of H queries, the number of Send queries, the number of bits in the biometric key, the range space of the hash function h(·) and the size of a uniformly distributed password dictionary D, respectively. Proof: The formal security proof followed in this theorem is similar to that presented in [37] , [53] , and [57] [58] [59] .
We require the following four games, Gm j (j = 0, 1, 2, 3), in this proof. We denote Succ A
Gm j
as an event in which the adversary A can win the game Gm j . Additionally, A's advantage in winning Gm j is denoted and defined by Adv A
• Game Gm 0 : In the initial game Gm 0 , bit c is first selected by a polynomial-time t adversary A. Since the Gm 0 and the actual protocol in the ROR are basically identical, it follows that
• Game Gm 
• Game Gm 3 : In this game, the CorruptSmartCard query is simulated. Therefore, A has the secret credentials
. Without the secret credentials r i and R c , it is computationally infeasible to derive the biometric secret key C T i and the password PW i of user U i . Assuming C T i is l bits, the guessing probability of C T i ∈ {0, 1} l by A is approximately 1 2 l [34] . In addition, it is assumed that the system will permit the adversary A to enter a limited number of wrong passwords. Note that games Gm 2 and Gm 3 are identical when password and biometrics guessing attacks are not involved. Hence, we have the following result:
Since all the games are executed, A can only guess the correct bit c. It then follows that
Eqs. (1), (2) and (5) give the following result:
The following result is obtained via the triangular inequality:
Eqs. (6) and (7) lead to the following result:
Finally, multiplying both sides of Eq. (8) by a factor of 2 and simplifying the terms, we obtain the required result:
B. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION USING BAN LOGIC
We apply the widely accepted Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic [52] to prove the mutual authentication between a legal registered user U i and a registered server S j for the proposed scheme in Theorem 2. The BAN logic has been widely used to provide mutual authentication of the authentication and session key agreement protocols [29] , [34] , [36] , [60] . The notation used in the BAN logic is given in Table 2 . The main rules of BAN logic are given below: Rule-1:
B,A X A|≡B|∼X

Rule-2:
A|≡ (X ),A|≡B|∼X A|≡B|≡X
Rule-3:
A|≡B⇒X ,A|≡B|≡X A|≡X
Rule-4:
Rule-5:
Rule-6:
Rule-1, Rule-2, Rule-3, Rule-4, Rule-5 and Rule-6 are known as the message meaning, nonce verification, jurisdiction, freshness-conjuncatenation, belief and session key rules, respectively.
Theorem 2: The proposed scheme achieves secure mutual authentication between a user U i and a server S j .
Proof: To prove this theorem, we first list the assumptions related to the proposed scheme.
• A1:
We set the following goals:
Idealized forms of messages: In the proposed scheme, messages
, TS i and Msg 2 = M 9 , M 10 , TS j can be written in their respective idealized forms as follows:
The main security proof consists of the following steps:
• Consider the message Msg 1 , the assumptions (A1, A6) and the message meaning rule (Rule-1). We obtain SS1: S j | ≡ U i |∼ N 1 .
• By applying assumption A1 and the nonce verification rule (Rule-2) on SS1, we obtain the following:
Now, N 1 is a necessary parameter of the session key SK ij in the proposed scheme.
• We then apply the jurisdiction rule (Rule-3) and assumption A4 on SS2 to obtain: SS3: S j | ≡ N 1 .
• The server S j believes that N 2 is fresh (according to assumption A2), and it is another necessary parameter of the session key SK ij . Therefore, by applying the session key rule (Rule-6), we obtain the following result:
• From message Msg 2 , we obtain SS5:
• Considering assumption A7, statement SS5 and Rule-1, we obtain SS6:
• Applying Rule-2 and assumption A2 on statement SS6, we obtain SS7:
where N 2 is a necessary parameter for session key SK ij .
• Using assumption A3, statement SS7 and Rule-3, we obtain SS8:
• U i believes that N 1 is fresh (from A1), and the combination of N 1 and N 2 produces an outcome that is also fresh. Therefore, by applying Rule-6 and assumption A1 on statement SS8, we obtain
It is then clear that both defined goals G 1 and G 2 are fulfilled in the proposed scheme. Hence, the secure mutual authentication between U i and S j is maintained in the proposed scheme.
C. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS AND OTHER DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we first provide the correctness of the proposed scheme in Theorem 3. Then, we discuss the security of our scheme informally (non-mathematical) for other known attacks. In addition, we discuss some important functionality features that are supported in the proposed scheme. Theorem 3: In the proposed scheme, both user U i and server S j establish the same session key during the login and mutual authentication & key agreement phases.
Proof: After receiving the login request message
. During the mutual authentication and key agreement phase, after receiving the authentication request message M 9 , M 10 , TS j from S j , U i computes the session key shared with the server S j as
Hence, the theorem is proved.
In the following, we show that the proposed scheme is secure against other attacks and that it provides some functionality features.
1) REPLAY ATTACK
Suppose an adversary A intercepts messages 4 , TS i and Msg 2 = M 9 , M 10 , TS j during the login and mutual authentication & agreement procedures and then tries to re-send these messages later to gain access to secret credentials. Note that after receiving Msg 1 , S j first checks the condition |TS i − TS i | < T to validate the freshness of the message. Since TS i is the current time stamp and is also included in M 2 and M 4 , the condition will fail due to the short maximum transmission delay threshold T used in the verification. A similar situation occurs when U i checks the validity of Msg 2 by the condition |TS * j − TS j | < T and it will fail again. Therefore, A will not be successful in launching the replay attack in the proposed scheme.
2) MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
In a man-in-the-middle attack, an adversary A may attempt to modify intercepted messages 
, A requires the secret credentials ID i , PSK j and SID j . Without these secret credentials, it is a computationally infeasible task for A to modify message Msg 1 into a valid message Msg 1 . Similarly, it is also computationally infeasible for A to modify message Msg 2 into a valid message. Therefore, the proposed scheme is resilient against this type of attack.
3) STOLEN SMART CARD ATTACK
According to the threat model discussed in Section I-A, an adversary A can extract all the secret credentials
} stored in a lost or stolen smart card SC i of an authorized user U i via power analysis attacks [8] , [9] , where
However, without the secret credentials r i and R c , it is a computationally infeasible task for A to derive biometric secret key C T i and password PW i of U i . Therefore, the proposed scheme resists stolen smart card attacks. In addition, offline password guessing attacks are also prevented in the proposed scheme.
4) PRIVILEGED-INSIDER ATTACK
An insider user of the trusted RC may act as a privilegedinsider attacker, say A. Then, A can record the registration information {ID i , RPW i ⊕ k} that is submitted to the RC by a registered user U i , where
Assume that after the user registration process, A has the lost or stolen smart card SC i of U i and extracts all the credentials stored in SC i , as stated in Section IV-C.3. However, according to Section IV-C.3, it is computationally infeasible for A to derive biometric secret key C T i and password PW i . Hence, the privileged-insider attack is also prevented by the proposed scheme.
5) IMPERSONATION ATTACKS
In this section, we discuss the following two impersonation attacks related to the proposed scheme.
• User impersonation attack: To convince server S j with the message sent on behalf of a legal user U i , an adversary A can generate a random nonce N * 1 and also current time stamp TS * i . Then, A can attempt to calculate the terms
However, this attempt by A will not succeed as the secret credentials ID i , SID j and PSK j are unknown to him/her. This indicates that the proposed scheme is resilient against user impersonation attacks.
• Server impersonation attack: In this attack, A tries to convince user U i with the message sent on behalf of the server S j . To achieve this goal, A can generate a random nonce N * 2 and current time stamp TS * j and then attempt to calculate the terms M 9 and M 10 in the formed authentication request message M 9 , M 10 , TS * j , where
) and the random number N 1 and time stamp TS i are generated by U i . However, without having the short-term secret N 1 and the long-term secrets ID i , SID j and PSK j , it is computationally infeasible for A to form a valid message M 9 , M 10 , TS * j . Therefore, it is clear that the server impersonation attack is also protected in the proposed scheme.
6) PASSWORD CHANGE ATTACK
In the password and biometric template update phase discussed in Section III-E, the smart card SC i of an authorized registered user U i first authenticates U i based on his/her entered identity ID i , current password PW i and biometrics BIO i by calculating
, and then verifying the conditions h(R ci ) = R and h(r i ) = P. If these conditions are valid, then only SC i allows U i to update the current password with a new password. Therefore, without knowing the secret credentials ID i , PW i and BIO i , it is computationally infeasible task for an adversary to update the password of U i . As a result, the password change attack is protected in the proposed scheme.
7) EPHEMERAL SECRET LEAKAGE (ESL) ATTACK
In the proposed scheme, the session key between a legal registered user U i and the server S j is computed as
In the following, we consider two cases.
• Case 1: Suppose an adversary A knows the short-term secrets N 1 and N 2 . However, without the long-term secrets ID i , SID j and PSK j , it is computationally infeasible to construct SK ij .
• Case 2: Assume A knows the long-term secrets ID i , SID j and PSK j . Then, without the short-term secrets N 1 and N 2 , it is computationally infeasible to construct SK ij . The above two cases clearly show that A will be successful in computing SK ij when both the short-term and long-term secrets are available. Thus, the proposed scheme is secure under the CK-adversary model (discussed in the threat model in Section I-A). In addition, we also assume that a particular session key is compromised by A. However, due to both longterm secrets and newly generated random nonces, the session keys created in the previous and future sessions are different. This means that the forward and backward secrecy goals as well as session key security are achieved. Moreover, a session hijacking attack does not help A to compromise the security of other previous and future sessions. As a consequence, our scheme is secure against ESL attack.
8) ANONYMITY AND UNTRACEABILITY
In our scheme, user identity ID i is incorporated within the r i , that is, r i = h(R ci ||ID i ||PW i ), and P = h(r i ) is stored in SC i . The SC i of U i transmits M 2 (i.e., M 2 = ID i ⊕ h(SV j ||TS i ) over the public channel in the message 4 , TS i and the terms M 9 and M 10 in message Msg 2 = M 9 , M 10 , TS j are dynamic and unique in each session due to the inclusion of the timestamps TS i and TS j and the random nonces N 1 and N 2 . As a result, an adversary cannot trace the same user over multiple sessions. Therefore, the untraceability property is preserved in the proposed scheme.
9) BIOMETRIC TEMPLATE PROTECTION
In the proposed scheme, the biometric data are transformed into a cancelable template to prevent the privacy of the biometric data of a legal registered user. Moreover, the template is not stored anywhere without protection. Biometric template extraction from a lost or stolen smart card of a user is computationally infeasible without knowledge of the user-specific random number R ci . Thus, the user biometric template is protected in the proposed scheme.
10) EFFICIENT PASSWORD/BIOMETRIC TEMPLATE UPDATE
During the password/biometric template update procedure of the proposed scheme, to change the current password and biometric template, a legal registered user U i inputs his/her identity, current password and biometrics into his/her smart card SC i . If all the entered secret credentials are valid, then U i is permitted to update the password and biometric template. Then, SC i updates the password and biometric template in its memory locally without contacting the RC. Thus, the password/biometric template update procedure is efficiently executed.
V. FORMAL SECURITY VERIFICATION USING AVISPA TOOL: A SIMULATION STUDY
The Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool [61] is widely used for formal security verification and is applied in many existing key management and authentication protocols [29] , [30] , [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] , [59] , [62] . The security of our scheme is also verified with the AVISPA tool. AVISPA provides four back ends, namely, 1) On-the-fly Model-checker (OFMC), 2) ConstraintLogic-based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe), 3) SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) and 4) Tree Automata based on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of Security Protocols (TA4SP). In AVISPA, HLPSL (High Level Protocols Specification Language), a role-based language, is used to specify the target protocol. The roles of all the participants (user, server and registration center) are represented as basic roles, whereas the composition of basic roles is represented as a composition role. The intruder (denoted by i in HLPSL) is modeled using the Dolev-Yao (DY) threat model. In the DY model, a channel is represented by channel(dy). This means that an adversary can intercept, modify, delete or insert VOLUME 6, 2018 fake message content during communication over a public channel. An HLPSL program implemented for a security protocol is compiled and converted into an Intermediate Format (IF) with the help of the HLPSL2IF translator. Then, the IF is provided to one of the four back ends, and the corresponding summary of security analysis is produced in an Output Format (OF). The analysis of a protocol indicates safe, unsafe or inconclusive. If the protocol is unsafe, the attack trace is included in the OF. Moreover, the overall statistics of the parse time, search time, translation time and computation time are displayed in the OF. The proposed scheme uses bitwise XOR operations in the protocol implementation. At present, the SATMC and TA4SP back ends do not support implementation of XOR operations; therefore, the output results under these back ends are inconclusive. Hence, we have omitted the simulation results under SATMC and TA4SP, and the results under only the OFMC and CLAtSe back ends are presented and discussed below.
We have implemented the basic roles for the user U i , the server S j and the RC for the proposed scheme in HLPSL. Moreover, the mandatory composite roles, such as session and goal & environment, are also implemented. The details of AVISPA, HLPSL and protocol implementation in HLPSL can be found in [61] .
The executability check ensures that a security protocol can reach to a state where a possible attack can occur during the run of that protocol. The HLPSL implementation of the proposed scheme is properly translated to HLPSL specification, and it meets the design goals by ensuring the executability. The proposed scheme is executed for the execution test and for a bounded number of sessions of model checking.
For replay attack checking, both the OFMC and CL-AtSe back ends check where the authorized agents can execute the specified protocol by performing a search of a passive intruder. In addition, both the OFMC and CL-AtSe back ends also check for the occurrence of a man-in-the-middle attack by intruder i for the DY model checking. The simulation results of the proposed scheme using the OFMC and CLAtSe back ends are shown in Figure 5 . Under the OFMC back end, the search time is 0.29 seconds, the number of visited nodes is 128 and the depth is 7 plies. The CL-AtSe back end takes 0.03 seconds for translation. The results reported in this figure clearly indicate that our scheme protects against replay & man-in-the-middle attacks.
VI. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
In this section, we conduct a detailed comparative study of the proposed scheme and other related multi-server authentication schemes, namely, the schemes of Chuang and Chen [23] , Amin and Biswas [30] , Sood et al. [24] , Mishra et al. [27] , He and Wang [33] , Lu et al. [31] , and Ali and Pal [63] .
A. SECURITY AND FUNCTIONALITY FEATURES COMPARISON
In Table 3 , we compare our scheme with other multi-server remote authentication schemes with respect to resilience against various attacks and preservation of various functionality features. It is worth noting that none of the existing schemes are completely free from security attacks. However, our proposed protocol is able to resist various known attacks and also supports more functionality features compared to other schemes. 
B. COMMUNICATION COSTS COMPARISON
We compare our scheme with related existing schemes in terms of communication costs in Table 4 . The communication cost is computed with respect to the requirement of the number of bits for the transmission of various messages among entities during the login and authentication phases. In this table, the third column (communication mode) represents message communication between various entities in the network. We assume that the bit lengths of user identity, server identity, hash output (message digest) (if we apply SHA-1 as the one-way hash function [64] ), time stamp and an elliptic curve point P = (P x , P y ) are 160, 160, 160, 32 and (160 + 160) = 320 bits, respectively, where P x and P y denote the x and y coordinates of point P, respectively. Moreover, it is also assumed that the security level of a 1024-bit RSA public key cryptosystem [65] is equivalent to that for 160-bit ECC (elliptic curve cryptography) [66] .
In our scheme, the communication cost required for the login request message M 2 , M 3 , M 4 , TS i transmitted from a user U i to a server S j is (160+160+160+32) = 512 bits and that for the authentication request message M 9 , M 10 , TS j transmitted to user U i from server S j is (160+160+32) = 352 bits. Thus, the total communication cost for our scheme is (512 + 352) = 864 bits. On the other hand, the communication costs for the schemes of Chuang and Chen [23] , Amin and Biswas [30] , Sood et al. [24] , Mishra et al. [27] , He and Wang [33] , Lu et al. [31] , and Ali and Pal [63] are 1024, 1920, 2112, 1280, 3520, 1226 and 1664 bits, respectively. It is worth noting that the communication overhead of our scheme is lower than that for all the other existing schemes.
C. COMPUTATION COSTS COMPARISON
Finally, we compare our scheme with the existing multiserver schemes with respect to the computation cost of login VOLUME 6, 2018 and authentication phases. The comparison results are shown in Table 5 . The following notation is used to represent the computation cost:
• C h : cost for executing a one-way cryptographic hash function
• C bh : execution cost for bio-hashing function • C fe : cost for executing a fuzzy extractor function • C fcs : cost for executing a fuzzy commitment scheme • C ecm : cost for executing an elliptic curve point multiplication
• C asym : cost for executing an asymmetric (public key) encryption/decryption
Based on the experimental results reported in [34] and [36] , we have C h ≈ 0.0023 ms, C ecm ≈ 2.226 ms and C asym ≈ 0.0046 ms. Moreover, C fe ≈ C ecm [33] . In addition, we assume that C bh ≈ C ecm and C fcs ≈ C ecm . Based on these results, we calculate the rough computation time (in milliseconds) and present the results in Table 5 . It is worth noting that our scheme has low computation cost compared to He-Wang's scheme [33] , and its cost is also comparable with the schemes of Amin-Biswas [30] , Lu et al. [31] and Ali-Pal [63] . Although our scheme has high computation cost compared to that for the schemes of Chuang-Chen [23] , Sood et al. [24] and Mishra et al. [27] , our scheme offers superior security and more functionality features (see Table 3 ).
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article, we proposed a new remote authentication and session key agreement protocol for multi-server environments using a fingerprint-based fuzzy commitment scheme. The proposed scheme supports correction of errors from noisy biometric data using an error correction technique under a fuzzy commitment scheme. The proposed scheme offers various security services, such as privacy preservation of user's identity and biometric data, mutual authentication and session key establishment between user and server, and facility of any time password updating and biometric data revocation without interaction with the RC and server, and a smart card revocation phase. The proposed scheme also provides an early error detection mechanism at the time of login, which resists denial of service attacks. The use of a hash function and fuzzy commitment scheme satisfies the computational complexity and overhead requirements during login, and the mutual authentication and session key agreement procedures of the proposed scheme are under control. The security of the proposed scheme is proved through a rigorous formal security assessment using the ROR model, informal (non-mathematical) security analysis, and formal security verification using the AVISPA simulation tool.
